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Abstract—US transmission systems and wholesale electricity
markets, albeit federally regulated, often span across multiple
state jurisdictions. In this environment, state regulators can
strategically exploit this techno-economic coupling to advance
their clean energy policy goals at the expense of neighbor-
ing jurisdictions. This paper investigates strategic regulatory
competition to understand its effect on achieving Renewable
Portfolio Standards (RPS). We formulate a chance-constrained
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (CC-EPEC),
which considers multiple state regulators, acting in coordination
with in-state power companies, to implement RPS goals in
the least-cost manner. To solve this CC-EPEC, we customize a
Progressive Hedging (PH) algorithm. The case study uses the CC-
EPEC and PH algorithm to analyze the effects of state regulatory
competition in the ISO New England system.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets and Indices
e ∈ E Set of representative operating days
i ∈ I Set of existing generators
i ∈ Iˆ Set of candidate generators
l ∈ L Set of transmission lines
n ∈ N Set of transmission nodes
s ∈ S Set of states, S={ME, NH, VT, MA, CT, RI}
t ∈ T Set of time intervals
IR, IC ⊂ I Set of renewable/controllable generators
In ⊂ I Set of generators located on bus n
Is ⊂ I Set of generators of regulator s
Ns ⊂ N Set of transmission nodes of regulator s
SOS1 Special ordered set of type 1
Kn Second order conic set
r(l), o(l) Receiving/sending node of line l
n(i) Node where generator i is located
s(i) State where generator i is located
B. Parameters
αit Participation parameter of controllable generator i
ite Forecast error of renewable generator i
ε Progressive hedging termination tolerance
ρite Forecast factor of generator i on time t
ρg, ρλ Progressive hedging penalty associated with g, λ
κs Renewable portfolio standard goal of regulator s
piDnt Retail electricity tariff of zone n
σite Normalized standard deviation of generation fore-
cast error of unit i [MW]
υite Normalized mean of generation forecast error of
unit i [MW]
ωe Probability of representative day e, (
∑
ωe = 1)
∆λ Size of a discretization step for the binary expan-
sion approach [$/MW]
Γi Minimum output limit factor of controllable gen-
erator i
PCTs Capacity tariff of regulator s [$/kW]
PETs Energy feed-in-tariff of regulator s [$/MWh]
BCs Budget for generation expansion of regulator s
BPs Budget for renewable policies of regulator s
C invi Capital cost of generator i (pro-rated on a daily ba-
sis using the net present value approach) [$/MW]
Cgi Incremental cost of generator i [$/MWh]
Dnte Real power demand of zone n [MW]
Fmaxl Apparent flow limit of line l [MVA]
Gminit Lower bound of generation power output of exist-
ing generator i [MW]
Gmaxit Upper bound of generation power output of exist-
ing generator i [MW]
Hmaxi Upward ramping limit of generator i [MW/h]
Hmini Downward ramping limit of generator i [MW/h]
K Discretization parameter for the binary expansion
approach
P ↓,maxn Apparent flow limit of the interface line into region
n from the transmission network [MVA]
Rite Allocated reserve capacity of generator i [MW]
Xl Reactance of transmission line l [Ω]
C. Variables
fplte, f
q
lte Real/Reactive power flow of line l [MW,MVar]
gite Real power output of generator i [MW]
gite Expected real power output of generator i [MW]
goite Offer of generator i into wholesale market [MW]
gite Dispatch signal of the wholesale market for gen-
erator i [MW]
gmaxi Investment decision variable of generator i [MW]
m
(i)
s , w
(i)
s Progressive hedging multiplier associated with
g, λ
p↓nte Interface power flow into region n from the
transmission network [MW]
λnte Locational marginal price in region n [$/MW]
θnte Node angle of transmission node n
D. Operators
‖·‖2 Euclidean norm (2-norm)
Stdev[·] Standard deviation
card(·) Cardinality of a set
Random variables/parameters are in bold fonts
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the mitigation of climate change, decarboniza-
tion policies have gained a lot of attention around the world. In
the U.S. electric power sector, state regulators lead such policy
efforts by setting the renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in
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Fig. 1: ISO New England 8-zone test system with renewable
portfolio standard goals as of January 2020.
their jurisdiction. RPS goals vary, but typically aim to achieve
a certain amount of electricity supply from renewable energy
resources (RES) by a target year. To support these goals,
there are various incentives that aim to shift power production
from fossil-fueled generation resources to RES, including such
policy measures as subsidies, tax credits, carbon tax, etc. [1],
[2]. However, RPS are energy-centric and do not explicitly
account for an increased need in the provision of ancillary
services to support a major increase in RES productions. Since
RES are limited in their ability to provide ancillary services
(in particular, active power reserves), anticipated retirement of
coal or nuclear resources may reduce the number of generators
capable of providing reserve, thus obstructing further RES
integration and implementation of RPS goals.
Historically, expansion of grid infrastructure has been
planned in a centralized framework, i.e. with a single entity
that makes operation and expansion decisions in the entire
system. Munoz et al. [3] investigated the effect of different
renewable policy scenarios on expansion decisions under this
framework. In a deregulated electricity market, centralized
planning with system-wide policy scenarios as in [3] may
yield inefficient results as power grids and wholesale markets
often span multiple jurisdictional boundaries. For example, the
ISO New England transmission system and market, which are
federally regulated, cover six state jurisdictions with different
RPS goals as illustrated in Fig. 1 [4]. In this environment, this
techno-economic coupling can be exploited by strategically
acting state regulators to advance their policy goals at the
expense of other states. Therefore, this strategic behavior
should be analyzed to properly assess the effectiveness of
renewable policies and power grid expansion.
Previously, strategic behavior in electricity markets has
been investigated in the context of expansion planning, e.g.
[5]–[7], to analyze strategic interactions between a market
participant and the wholesale electricity market. In [5]–[7],
bilevel programs are used to co-optimize generation expansion
decisions for different types of power producers in the upper
level and wholesale market-clearing decisions in the lower
CC-EPEC Problem
Model Structure
CC-MPEC #1 CC-MPEC #N
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Fig. 2: Proposed models and reformulation structure.
level. Next, these programs are equivalently reformulated as
a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC)
and converted into mixed-integer linear programs. To model
a competition among multiple strategic market participants,
models in [8]–[10] formulate an equilibrium problem with
equilibrium constraints (EPEC), which consists of multiple
MPECs. Each MPEC represents a strategic optimization prob-
lem of an individual market participant, while the EPEC seeks
a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) among all MPECs.
In [8], [9], the GNE problem considers an energy market in
the lower level, while [10] extends the lower level to include
reserve and capacity markets. However, to our best knowledge,
no work is devoted to analyzing regulatory competition in
electricity markets by solving a stochastic EPEC.
This paper takes the combined perspective of state reg-
ulators and in-state power companies to investigate effects
of their coordinated strategic behavior in a wholesale elec-
tricity market on achieving their RPS goals. This combined
perspective is motivated because, in practice, state regula-
tors and power companies jointly seek ways and means to
achieve RPS goals [11]. Therefore, in our model, we assume
that they coordinate generation expansion decisions, which
in turn affects the power company’s participation strategy
in the wholesale electricity market. To appropriately model
these interactions in a multi-state regulatory environment, we
first formulate a bilevel problem, later recast as an MPEC,
for each strategic actor (i.e. the state regulator and in-state
power companies) that aims to implement its RPS objective
in the least-cost manner. Each bilevel problem considers a
generation expansion problem in the upper level (including
RES and fossil-fueled generation) and the wholesale electricity
market in the lower level, which is common for all actors.
To gain computational tractability, we model RES uncertainty
via chance constraints and equivalently reformulate them as
deterministic second-order conic constraints. In contrast to the
traditional scenario-based stochastic models in [5]–[10], which
are computationally demanding and produce a solution that
can be inefficient to individual scenarios considered, chance
constrained stochastic programs yield robustified solutions
toward renewable uncertainties. Then, we formulate a chance
3constrained EPEC (CC-EPEC) to solve MPECs jointly using
the lower-level KKT-optimality conditions as shown in Fig. 2.
The resulting problem is NP-hard due to the nonlinear and
non-convex feasible region and, therefore, cannot be solved
efficiently with off-the-shelf solvers, [12].
To overcome this computational complexity, we first lin-
earize bilinear terms using the SOS1 variables and binary
expansion approach [13]. Then, we customize the Progressive
Hedging (PH) algorithm, [14], [15] to solve the proposed CC-
EPEC. Unlike the conventional PH algorithm, which decom-
poses the original problem into scenario-dependent problems,
our PH implementation decomposes the proposed CC-EPEC
across each MPEC, i.e. we treat each strategic actor as a
scenario, and solve them iteratively. Each decomposed MPEC
is a mixed-integer second-order conic program (MISOCP) and
can be tractably solved.
Therefore, this paper makes two primary contributions.
First, we propose a computationally tractable CC-EPEC for-
mulation. Second, we develop a PH-inspired algorithm to
efficiently solve this CC-EPEC, which otherwise cannot be
solved with off-the-shelf solvers (our attempts failed due to the
out-of-memory issues). These technical contributions make it
possible to analyze the generation expansion decisions needed
to support the RPS objectives in the ISO New England sys-
tem with sufficient reserve capacity provided by controllable
generators under different retirement scenarios.
II. MODEL
The proposed model and its reformulation are structured
in Fig. 2. Within the limited investment budget, the state
regulator and power companies in each state devise a gen-
eration expansion plan to achieve a given RPS goal. This
section first describes an uncertainty model and dispatch of
controllable generation resources under uncertainty. Then, we
formulate a CC-MPEC for each strategically acting actor and
chance constraints are converted into the exact equivalent SOC
formulation. Finally, given the CC-MPEC formulation, we
model a regulatory competition problem as CC-EPEC.
A. Uncertainty model
Generation outputs of existing RES generation units i∈IR
with given predicted output gite=ρiteG
max
i and forecast error
ite are modeled as a random variable:
gite = gite + ite = ρiteG
max
i + ite, ∀i ∈ IR, t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
(1a)
where ρite ∈ [0, 1] is a forecast factor of RES generator i and
Gmaxi is its installed capacity. The forecast error is assumed
to be Gaussian, ite ∼ Norm
(
Gmaxi υite, (G
max
i σite)
2
)
, with
mean Gmaxi υite and standard deviation G
max
i σi, where υite
and σite are the normalized mean and standard deviation.
Similarly, the generation output of candidate RES gen-
eration units i ∈ IˆR is given in Eq. (1b) with invest-
ment decision variable gmaxi and forecast error ite ∼
Norm
(
gmaxi υite, (g
max
i σite)
2
)
:
gite = gite + ite = ρiteg
max
i + ite, ∀i ∈ IˆR, t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
(1b)
Since forecast errors result in a mismatch between the power
produced and power consumed, existing and candidate con-
trollable generation resources (i ∈ IC ∪ IˆC) must offset this
imbalance. In practice, the real-time affine control is used [16]
and modeled as:
gite = gite−αit
∑
j∈IR
s(i)
∪IˆR
s(i)
jte, ∀i ∈ IC∪IˆC, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (1c)
where
∑
i∈ICs ∪IˆCs αit = 1. Synchronized generators continu-
ously offset the power mismatch and control parameter αit is
usually set ahead of time, e.g. αit = 1/card(ICs ∪ IˆCs ), or can
be optimized as in [17].
B. Optimization of a single strategic actor
We formulate a bilevel program of the single strategic actor
(state regulator and in-state power company) as:
max
ΞSA
OSAs := E
[∑
e∈E
{
ωe
∑
t∈T
(∑
n∈Ns
piDntDnte −
∑
n∈Ns
λntep
↓
nte
− PETs
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
gite −
∑
i∈Is
Cgi gite
)}]
− PCTs
∑
i∈IˆRs
gmaxi −
∑
i∈Iˆs
C invi g
max
i
(2a)
subject to:
P[gite ≤ Gmaxi ] ≥ 1− η, ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (2b)
P[gite ≤ gmaxi ] ≥ 1− η, ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (2c)
P[gite ≥ Gmini ] ≥ 1− η, ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (2d)
P[gite ≥ Γigmaxi ] ≥ 1− η, ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (2e)
Hmini ≤gite−gi,t−1,e≤Hmaxi , ∀i ∈ ICs ∪IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
(2f)∑
i∈In∪Iˆn
gite +p
↓
nte =Dnte, ∀t ∈ T , n ∈ Ns, e ∈ E , (2g)
−P ↓,maxn ≤ p↓nte ≤ P ↓,maxn , ∀t ∈ T , n ∈ Ns, e ∈ E , (2h)∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
gite ≥ κs
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈Ns
Dnte, ∀e ∈ E , (2i)
∑
i∈Iˆs
C invi g
max
i ≤ BCs , (2j)∑
t∈T
(
PETs
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
gite
)
+ PCTs
∑
i∈IˆRs
gmaxi ≤ BPs , ∀e ∈ E ,(2k){
ΞWMe ⊆ arg max
(
OWM :=
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
−Cgi gite
)
, (2l)
(ξlte) : flte =
1
Xl
(θo(l),t,e − θr(l),t,e), ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T ,
(2m)
(λnte) :
∑
i∈In∪Iˆn
gite +
∑
l|r(l)=n
flte−
∑
l|o(l)=n
flte = Dnte,
∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T ,
(2n)
(γ
ite
, γite) : 0 ≤ gite ≤ goite, ∀i ∈ I ∪ Iˆ, t ∈ T , (2o)
where goite=
{
gite, ∀i ∈ Is ∪ Iˆs, t ∈ T ,
ρiteG
max
i −Rite, ∀i ∈ I−s ∪ Iˆ−s, t ∈ T ,
4(δlte, δlte) : −Fmaxl ≤ flt ≤ Fmaxl , ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , (2p)}
, ∀e ∈ E ,
where ΞSA =
{
gite, g
max
i ≥ 0; p↓nte: free
}
and ΞWMe ={
gite, flte, θnte: free
}
. The upper level in Eq. (2a)-(2k) op-
timizes decisions of the single strategic actor, while the lower
level in Eq. (2l)-(2p) clears the wholesale electricity market.
In the upper-level problem, objective function (2a) maxi-
mizes the expected social-welfare of state s over the operating
horizon t ∈ T , which includes the revenue collected by selling
electricity in-state minus the operating and investment costs.
Note that investment cost C invi is pro-rated on a daily basis
using the net present value approach as in [18]. Eq. (2b)-
(2e) enforce the power output limits of existing (ICs ) and
candidate controllable generators (IˆCs ) of the strategic actor in
state s, while the uncertainty imposed by renewable resources
is modeled via chance constraints, and random variable gite
is defined as in Eq. (1). Ramping constraints of controllable
generators are given in (2f), and Eq. (2i) imposes the RPS
requirement in state s. The capital cost budget is enforced
in Eq. (2j) and the budget limits on the renewable policy,
including energy feed-in-tariff PETs and capacity tariff P
CT
s ,
are given in Eq. (2k). In the lower-level problem, objective
function (2l) maximizes the social welfare across all states
s ∈ S. Eq. (2m) models DC power flows and Eq. (2n) enforces
the power balance. Eq. (2o)-(2p) limit generation outputs and
line capacities. Dual variables of Eq. (2m)-(2p) are defined in
parentheses before each constraint.
C. Conic reformulation of the chance constraints
Using [17], [19], the chance constraints in Eq. (2b)-(2e)
can be equivalently reformulated into deterministic constraints
(3a)-(3d), where Φ−1(·) is an inverse cumulative distribution
function and Stdev[·] is a standard deviation operator:
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
+ Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[git] ≤ Gmaxi , ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T ,
(3a)
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
+ Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[git] ≤ gmaxi , ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T ,
(3b)
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
− Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[git] ≥ Gmini , ∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T ,
(3c)
gite − αit
( ∑
j∈IRs
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆRs
gmaxj υjte
)
− Φ−1(1−η)Stdev[git] ≥ Γigmaxi , ∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T ,
(3d)
Stdev[git]=αit
√√√√ ∑
j∈IR
s(i)
(Gmaxj σjte)
2+
∑
j∈IˆR
s(i)
(gmaxj σjte)
2.
(3e)
Since participation factor αit can be modeled as a param-
eter [16], Eq. (3) can be represented as second-order conic
constraints. We define auxiliary vector variable xste ∈ Ru+v
in (4a), where u = card(IRs ), and v = card(IˆRs ), so that
Stdev[git] = αit‖xs(i),t,e‖2. The remaining terms in Eq. (3),
except for ‖xs(i),t,e‖2, are aggregated in variables yite, yite ∈
R as shown in Eq. (4b)-(4c):
xs(i),t,e:=
[
Gmax1 σ1te, · · · , Gmaxu σute, gmax1 σu+1,t,e,
· · · , gmaxv σu+v,t,e
]>
, ∀i ∈ IC ∪ IˆC
(4a)
y
ite
:=

{gite−αit(
∑
j∈IR
s(i)
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆR
s(i)
gmaxj υjte)}−Gmini
Φ−1(1−η)αit ,
∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
{gite−αit(
∑
j∈IR
s(i)
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆR
s(i)
gmaxj υjte)}−Γigmaxi
Φ−1(1−η)αit ,
∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
(4b)
yite:=

Gmaxi −{gite−αit(
∑
j∈IR
s(i)
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆR
s(i)
gmaxj υjte)}
Φ−1(1−η)αit ,
∀i ∈ ICs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
gmaxi −{gite−αit(
∑
j∈IR
s(i)
Gmaxj υjte+
∑
j∈IˆR
s(i)
gmaxj υjte)}
Φ−1(1−η)αit ,
∀i ∈ IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E .
(4c)
Finally, using Eq. (3)-(4), we can replace chance constraints
in Eq. (2d)-(2c) by deterministic SOC constraints as follows:[
y
ite
xs(i),t,e
]
∈ Ku+v+1, ∀i ∈ ICs ∪ IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (5a)[
yite
xs(i),t,e
]
∈ Ku+v+1, ∀i ∈ ICs ∪ IˆCs , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (5b)
where Kn+1 is the following second-order cone:
Kn+1 :={[y; x] | y≥√x21+· · ·+x2n, y∈R, x∈Rn}. (5c)
D. CC-MPEC reformulation
Since the lower-level problem in (2l)-(2p) is linear, Eq. (2)
can be equivalently converted into a single-level CC-MPEC
problem by using the lower-level KKT optimality conditions:
max
ΞSA
OSAs := E
[∑
e∈E
{
ωe
∑
t∈T
(∑
n∈Ns
piDntDnte −
∑
n∈Ns
λntep
↓
nte
− PETs
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
gite −
∑
i∈Is
Cgi gite
)}]
− PCTs
∑
i∈IˆRs
gmaxi −
∑
i∈Iˆs
C invi g
max
i
(6a)
subject to:
Upper-level Constraints : Eq. (2g)–(2k), (5) (6b)
Lower-level Equality Constraints : Eq. (2m)–(2n) (6c)
Lower-level KKT conditions:
− Cgi + λn(i),t,e + γite − γite = 0,
∀i ∈ I ∪ Iˆ, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (6d)
ξlte + λr(l),t,e − λo(l),t,e + δlte − δlte = 0,
∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (6e)
−
∑
l|o(l)=n
ξlte
Xl
+
∑
l|r(l)=n
ξlte
Xl
= 0, ∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (6f)
50 ≤ gite ⊥ γite ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I ∪ Iˆ, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (6g)
0 ≤ goite−gite⊥γite≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I ∪ Iˆ, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (6h)
0 ≤ flte − Fminl ⊥ δlte ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (6i)
0 ≤ Fmaxl − flte ⊥ δlte ≥ 0, ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (6j)
where Eq. (6b) lists constraints of the strategic actor, Eq. (6c)
restates the lower-level equality constraints and Eq. (6d)-
(6j) describe the stationary conditions and complementary
slackness of lower-level inequality constraints. Note that ⊥
in Eq. (6g)-(6j) denotes orthogonality, i.e. x ⊥ y ⇔ x>y = 0.
E. CC-EPEC formulation
Finally, we formulate the CC-EPEC as:{
[CC-MPECSAs := Eq. (6)], ∀s ∈ S
}
, (7)
where CC-MPECSAs represents the strategic actor (state regu-
lator and power company) in state s modeled in Section II-D.
III. SOLUTION TECHNIQUE
The proposed CC-EPEC in (7) is computationally challeng-
ing due to the nonlinear and non-convex feasible region and
two-stage (investment and operation) structure. Therefore, we
first linearize bilinear terms to recast the CC-MPEC in (6) as
mixed-integer SOCP and then apply the PH algorithm.
A. Linearization
The KKT conditions in the lower-level problem of Eq. (7)
include bilinear terms giteγite, giteγite, flteδlte and flteδlte in
(6g)–(6j), which arise from complementarity slackness condi-
tions. These nonlinearities are typically dealt with using the
Fortuny-Amat & McCarl transformation [20], which replaces
the bilinear terms with mixed-integer linear constraints param-
eterized by exogenous parameter (so-called big M). However,
finding a value of big M that ensures a stable and tractable
computational performance is itself a NP-hard problem [21].
In practice, the big M method increases complexity of the
underlying problem and leads to numerical issues even when
state-of-the-art solvers are used [21]–[23]. These challenges
can be overcome by means of using SOS1 variables (a set
of variables, in which at most one variable within the set is
allowed to attain a non-zero value), which are numerically
robust and supported by off-the-shelf MIP solvers (e.g. Gurobi,
CPLEX) [23], [24]. For instance, 0 ≤ gite ⊥ γite ≥ 0 in (6g)
can be recast as:
{gite, γite} ∈ SOS1, gite, γite ≥ 0. (8)
In fact, the advantage of (8) relative to the Fortuny-Amat
transformation is that MIP solvers (e.g. Gurobi) reformulate
SOS1 constraints as disjunctive constraints and validate their
exactness to avoid numerical errors [23].
Additionally, the objective function in (6a) also includes
bilinear term λn(i),t,egite, which cannot be modeled via SOS1
variables because both λn(i),t,e and gite can simultaneously
attain non-zero values. Instead, we linearize λn(i),t,egite using
the binary expansion method, [13], which introduces auxiliary
binary variables similar to the Fortuny-Amat & McCarl trans-
formation, but does not require orthogonality in bilinear terms.
First, continuous variable λnte is discretized into 2K levels,
where K is a user-defined parameter, as:
λnte = λn + ∆λ
K∑
k=1
2k−1zntke, zntke ∈ {0, 1}, (9a)
Then, bilinear term λn(i),t,egite can be written as:
λn(i),t,egite = λn(i)gite + ∆λ
K∑
k=1
2k−1sitke, (9b)
where:
0 ≤ sitke ≤ gmaxi zn(i),tke, (9c)
gite− gmaxi (1−zn(i),t,k,e) ≤ sn(i),t,k,e ≤ gite. (9d)
There is a natural trade-off between the choice of discretiza-
tion parameter K and the accuracy of the binary expansion
approach. This choice affects performance of the solver be-
cause it changes the number of discrete decisions and, hence,
parameter K should be calibrated carefully.
B. PH Algorithm
Structurally, the CC-EPEC in Eq. (7) is a collection of
CC-MPECs that share the same lower-level problem, which
can be cast as a multi-leader-common-follower (MLCF) game,
[12], where leaders are strategic actors and the follower is the
9
Algorithm 1: PH Algorithm
1. Initialization: i := 0,m(i=0)s := 0, w(i=0)s := 0
2. Iteration 0: for s ∈ S do
g
(i=0)
ites ,λ
(i=0)
ntes ← argmax
gite,λnte
{Eq. (6)}
end
3. Aggregation: E[g(i=0)ites ]← 1card(S)
∑
s∈S
g
(i=0)
ites ,
E[λ(i=0)ntes ]← 1card(S)
∑
s∈S
λ
(i=0)
ntes
4. Iteration: do
4-1. Iteration update: i← i+ 1
4-2. Solve subproblems: for s ∈ S do
m
(i)
s ←m(i−1)s + ρg
(
g
(i−1)
ites −Es[g(i−1)ites ]
)
w
(i)
s ←w(i−1)s + ρλ
(
λ
(i−1)
ntes −Es[λ(i−1)ntes ]
)
g
(i)
ites,λ
(i)
ntes←
argmax
gite,λnte
{
OSAs −m(i)s gite −w(i)s λnte −
ρg
2
∥∥gite−Es[g(i−1)ites ]∥∥22− ρλ2 ∥∥λnte−Es[λ(i−1)ntes ]∥∥22
| Eqs. (6b)–(6j)
}
end
4-3. Aggregation: E[g(i)ites]← 1card(S)
∑
s∈S
g
(i)
ites,
E[λ(i)ntes]← 1card(S)
∑
s∈S
λ
(i)
ntes,
ε(i)←
1
card(S)
(∑
s∈S
‖g(i)ites−E[g(i)ites]‖22+
∑
s∈S
‖λ(i)ntes−E[λ(i)ntes]‖22
)
while ε(i) > ε
return gite := g
(i)
ites, λnte := λ
(i)
ntes
6wholesale market. This MLCF representation motivates the
decomposition of the CC-EPEC in Eq. (7) for each leader and
treat each decomposed problem as an individual “scenario”.
This leader-based decomposition, resembling a scenario-based
two-stage stochastic optimization problem, makes it possible
to customize the PH algorithm [14]. Thus, lower-level decision
variables gits and λnts of each MPEC are treated as hedging
variables. At each iteration, all decomposed MPECs are solved
independently and the deviation of hedging variables from
the consensus is penalized. The process iterates until the
consensus is reached among hedging variables (the difference
is sufficiently small), thus achieving an equilibrium among
MPECs, which in solves the CC-EPEC in Eq. (7).
This PH implementation is detailed in Algorithm 1. Step
1 initializes iteration counter i and PH multipliers ms, ωs.
Step 2 executes the initial iteration and obtains the solution
of each MPECSAs in Eq. (6). Step 3 computes the average of
hedging variables. Next, Step 4-2 at each iteration augments
and solves MPECSAs in Eq. (6), where the difference between
a given and average hedging variable is penalized by PH
multipliers m(i)s and w
(i)
s , directing the solution toward the
consensus. Step 4-3 updates the value of hedging variables and
computes achieved termination tolerance (i). Step 4 iterates
until a desired termination tolerance is achieved.
IV. CASE STUDY
We use the 8-zone ISO New England system, [4], cov-
ering 6 states, shown in Fig. 1. The system includes 76
controllable and 16 renewable generation resources, and can-
didate generator set Iˆn contains natural gas (C invi =$895/kW,
Cgi =$20/MWh), wind (C
inv
i =$1,630/kW, C
g
i =$1.1/MWh) and
solar (C invi =$2,434/kW, C
g
i =$0.4/MWh) options in each zone
n ∈ N . The installed capacity of existing resources in the sys-
tem is itemized by state and type in Table I and the transmis-
sion network data is provided in Table II. The average system
TABLE I. EXISTING GENERATION CAPACITY BY STATE AND TYPE [MW]
ME NH VT MA CT RI
Wind 221.2 140.5 39.0 681.7 132.5 85
Solar 41.4 83.84 306.3 1871.26 464.34 116.66
Nuclear 0 1244 620.2 684.7 2116 0
Coal 311.8 95.4 0 144.4 744.4 1099.5
Oil 1146.9 400.2 0 1111.7 2212.8 435
Natural Gas 3862.7 508 0 2249.6 621.4 3491.6
TABLE II. TRANSMISSION LINES SPECIFICATIONS OF THE ISO NEW
ENGLAND SYSTEM [4]
Line From To Distance[miles]
Resistance
[Ω/m]
Reactance
[Ω/m]
Capacity
[MW]
1 ME NH 115 19.09 54.05 1200
2 VT NH 100 16.6 47 1200
3 VT WCMA 150 24.9 70.5 1200
4 WCMA NH 86 14.28 40.42 1200
5 NEMA WCMA 80 13.28 37.6 1200
6 NEMA NH 63 10.46 29.61 1200
7 NEMA SEMA 30 4.98 14.1 1200
8 WCMA CT 30 4.98 14.1 1200
9 WCMA RI 65 10.79 30.55 1200
10 NEMA RI 40 6.64 18.8 1200
11 CT RI 64 10.62 30.08 1200
12 SEMA RI 20 3.32 9.4 1200
peak demand over all scenarios is
∑
e∈E ωs
∑
n∈N Dnte =
10, 243 MW. Capital and operating costs are calculated based
on the data from the EIA 2019 annual report [25] and the wind
and solar installed capacity and hourly forecast data is obtained
from the ISO New England online library [26], [27]. In this
case study, we implement the RPS targets as given in Fig. 1
over the same planning horizon. All controllable generators are
assumed to be committed and we set the normalized standard
deviation of forecast errors (σite) as 0.1 and 0.2 for wind and
solar resources, while security tolerance is set to η = 0.03.
The net present value of investment costs assumes the cost
recovery period of 10 years with 5% annual discount rate.
The PH penalty factors are set as ρg = ρλ = 0.7 and dual
variable λnte is discretized with K = 10 in Eq. (9a). The
termination tolerance of the PH algorithm is  = 0.03. Energy-
and capacity-specific incentives are set to PETs = $3/MWh
and PCTs = $300/kW [25]. We consider different retirement
scenarios: a) Basecase (no retirement), b) Coal retirement
and c) Coal & Nuclear retirement. The centralized generation
planning model in [3], detailed in Appendix, is used for
benchmarking. All simulations are implemented using Julia
v1.2.0 and JuMP v0.20 [28] and solved by Gurobi v8.1 on an
Intel Xeon 2.6 GHz processor with 10 cores and 250GB of
memory. The code source and input data are available in [29].
A. Case Study 1: One strategic actor
We consider one strategic actor in the ISO New England
by solving the CC-MPEC in Eq. (6) for each state. Fig. 3
displays investment decisions in controllable (
∑
i∈IˆCs g
max
i )
and renewable generation resources (
∑
i∈IˆRs g
max
i ) of the
strategic actor in state s. In all cases, the installed renewable
capacity is identical as the RPS requirement remains the same
and installations beyond the RPS requirement are prevented by
relatively high capital costs and low capacity factors, even with
energy- and capacity-based renewable incentives. On the other
hand, controllable generation resources are not installed at all
in ME and NH since they have a sufficient amount of existing
capacity to provide reserve in all the retirement scenarios.
However, in the cases of VT, CT and RI, the investments in
controllable resources are made in the most aggressive coal &
nuclear retirement scenario. There are two main reasons for
these decisions: 1) to replenish retiring resources and 2) to
export surplus generation to neighboring states. Notably, MA
requires controllable generation installations in all retirement
scenarios, even in the no retirement case, and their capacity
gradually increases as more aggressive retirement is planned.
Figure 4 compares the investment decisions in controllable
generation of the CC-MPEC and the centralized planning
benchmark model. Strategically acting ME and NH yield the
same outcomes as in the benchmark. In the cases of VT
or MA being strategic, pursing their RPS objectives requires
less controllable generation installed relative to the benchmark
case. On the other hand, CT and RI need to install more
controllable generation capacity than the benchmark under the
coal & nuclear retirement scenario, if they act strategically,
to achieve a lower combined capital and operating cost. The
corresponding operating and investment costs of the CC-
MPECs for all retirement scenarios are compared in Fig. 5.
7Fig. 3: CC-MPEC: Generation expansion decisions for controllable
(C) and renewable (R) resources under different retirement scenarios.
Fig. 4: The difference of investments in controllable resources (∆,
[GW]) between the CC-MPEC and the benchmark case.
Fig. 5: CC-MPEC: Investment and operating costs for controllable
(C) and renewable (R) resources under different retirement scenarios.
Fig. 6: CC-EPEC: Generation expansion decisions for controllable
(C) and renewable (R) resources under different retirement scenarios.
Fig. 7: The difference of investments in controllable resources (∆,
[GW]) between the CC-EPEC and the benchmark case.
Fig. 8: CC-EPEC: Investment and operating costs for controllable
(C) and renewable (R) resources under different retirement scenarios.
B. Case Study 2: Multiple strategic actors
This case study considers all states simultaneously acting
strategically by solving the CC-EPEC in Eq. (7). Figure 6
compares the generation expansion decisions of all six states
in this case. Similar to the CC-MPEC case in Fig. 3, renewable
investment decisions are the same because the RPS goals
remain fixed. However, the installed controllable generation
capacity increases relative to the CC-MPEC case. The only
exception is RI, which reduces the amount of the controllable
generation installed as compared to the CC-MPEC case,
due to the increased expansion in neighboring regions and
reduced transmission congestion in lines connecting RI to
other regions, which makes it more cost effective to supply
electricity from other states. Finally, Fig. 8 summarizes the
operating and investment costs. All costs show the same trend
as in the CC-MPEC case, but the total cost for each individual
region increases due to the competition.
C. Computational performance
All CC-MPEC instances are solved within 6 hours and the
longest instance was solved within 7 hours. The CC-MPEC
solution for each state was used as an initial solution (Step 2)
in Algorithm 1. Table III summarizes computing times of the
TABLE III. COMPUTING TIMES [S]
Cases Average time Max time Total Iterationsper iter per iter time required
Basecase 2,976 9,516 181,581 61
Coal ret. 2,476 7,365 71,802 29
Coal & 5,786 2,706 92,577 19Nuclear ret.
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Fig. 9: Relative convergence of the proposed PH algorithm.
proposed PH algorithm under different retirement scenarios,
where solving each augmented MPEC subproblem (Step 4-2)
varies from 1 minute to 2.64 hours. Such variations in solving
times often occur in the PH implementations because subprob-
lems with solutions (g(i)ites, λ
(i)
ntes) away from the consensus
8solution (Es[g(i)ites],Es[λ
(i)
ntes]) take more time to be solved.
On the other hand, subproblems with solutions in a relative
proximity to the consensus solution are typically solved faster.
[15]. All instances for each retirement case require 32 hours on
average and tens of iterations to converge as shown in Fig. 9.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper develops a CC-EPEC model to investigate the
effects of regulatory competition on achieving RPS goals in
six states in the ISO New England system. This CC-EPEC is
computationally demanding and, therefore, the PH algorithm
was customized to solve the CC-EPEC efficiently. The case
study enabled by the proposed model and algorithm reveals:
1) Compared to the uniform-policy benchmark, strategic
behavior tends to reduce the controllable generation ca-
pacity needed to support RPS goals for a single strategic
actor in all but aggressive retirement scenarios
2) On the other hand, the case with multiple strategic
actors leads to an increased expansion of controllable
generators, regardless of the retirement scenario
3) Aggressive retirement scenarios strongly influence the
controllable generation capacity needed to achieve RPS
goals, regardless of the number of strategic actors.
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APPENDIX
The benchmark model is based on the model from [3],
implemented with appropriate modifications as follows:
maxOB :=
∑
e∈E
[
ωe
∑
t∈T
( ∑
n∈N
piDntDnte−
∑
i∈I∪Iˆ
Cgi gite
−
∑
i∈IR∪IˆR
PETs(i)gite
)]
−
∑
i∈IˆR
PCTs(i)g
max
i −
∑
i∈Iˆ
C invi g
max
i
(10a)
subject to:
Gmini ≤ gite ≤ Gmaxi −rite, ∀i ∈ IC, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (10b)
Γig
max
i ≤ gite ≤ gmaxi −rite, ∀i ∈ IˆC, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (10c)∑
i∈In∪Iˆn
gite +
∑
l|r(l)=n
flte−
∑
l|o(l)=n
flte = Dnte,
∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T , e ∈ E ,
(10d)
∑
i∈IC∪IˆC
rite ≥ Rte, ∀t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (10e)
flte =
1
Xl
(θo(l),t,e − θr(l),t,e), ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (10f)
− Fmaxl ≤ flte ≤ Fmaxl , ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T , e ∈ E , (10g)∑
t∈T
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
gite ≥ κs
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈Ns
Dnte, ∀e ∈ E , (10h)
∑
i∈Iˆs
C invi g
max
i ≤ BCs , (10i)
∑
t∈T
(
PETs
∑
i∈IRs ∪IˆRs
gite
)
+PCTs
∑
i∈IˆRs
gmaxi ≤ BPs , ∀e ∈ E . (10j)
